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Abstract
Inclusivity is widely considered a requirement of defensible environmental
risk consultations and is often either mandated or recommended to help
ensure attention to stakeholders’ diverse views. Experience suggests the
opposite: the emphasis on an inclusive consultation process often makes it
impossible for decision makers to listen carefully to stakeholders and for
citizens’ views to influence the design and choice of proposed actions. This
paper briefly reviews the promise of environmental risk consultations
before outlining several of the more serious problems associated with an
emphasis on inclusivity: long lists of undifferentiated concerns, facts tainted
by stakeholders’ perspectives and worldviews, little access to clarifying
dialogue or tests of expertise, few opportunities to scrutinize knowledge
quality, avoidance of controversial issues, and an overwhelming abundance
of information. As a result, the promotion of inclusivity often serves as a
convenient excuse for decision makers to silence citizens by substituting
quantity for quality, breadth for depth, and an adversarial approach for
dialogue and informed understanding.
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This paper examines the logic of inclusivity in environmental risk assess-
ments and public consultations convened to examine the impacts of past,
current, or proposed human actions. The usual assumption is that inclusivity
in environmental consultations is always good; the associated prescription
is to identify the full range of potentially affected parties and experts, learn
about their concerns regarding the consequences of actions, and then deter-
mine—perhaps after the inclusion of mitigation or compensation—the
overall costs and benefits of an initiative.
Reliance on inclusive consultation processes for larger development
projects is common in modern democratic societies, ostensibly to ensure
that the voices of potentially affected citizens are heard and can influence
the choices and actions of government and industry. Robert Dahl (1989), for
example, has proposed ‘‘effective participation’’ as one of five criteria for
any democratic process, stating that ‘‘ . . . citizens ought to have an ade-
quate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their prefer-
ences . . . [and] for placing questions on the agenda . . . ’’ (p. 109) This
belief leads to the hiring of extra staff, consultants, or facilitators to obtain
input about a proposed initiative from hundreds or thousands of potentially
affected individuals and groups, resulting in a massive amount of informa-
tion that is claimed as evidence of consultation success.
Following this same logic, environmental regulations in many countries
require that public participation efforts for large projects have an open door,
inclusive mandate. Yet for major environmental initiatives, the quantity of
stakeholder input is mistakenly considered to be a proxy for consultation
quality. Unless other, more detailed efforts are also undertaken, the identi-
fication of inclusivity as a fundamental objective typically ensures that
stakeholders are unable to articulate their concerns, experts are unable to
clarify relevant facts, and decision makers are unable to organize or under-
stand citizens’ input. The result is that society misses out on what it osten-
sibly seeks to achieve.
The presumed impetus for inclusivity is understandable: for the best of
reasons, decisionmakersmaywant an overall picture of howcitizens feel and
seek to understand which individuals and groups are likely to either support
or oppose proposed initiatives. Other consequences of the reliance on inclu-
sive public processes by government and industry, however, are less benign.
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When hundreds or thousands of stakeholders are asked to (a) speak before a
panel for ten to fifteen minutes, (b) submit short written statements to a
government body, or (c) participate as representatives of identified interests,
then the invitation contains an implicit request to be either superficial or one-
dimensional. Collecting all this information, again in the interest of estab-
lishing an inclusive process, leads to the ‘‘failures’’ identified in this paper:
substituting long lists of undifferentiated concerns for concise summaries of
clearly articulated values at risk, including facts tainted by stakeholders’
perspectives and worldviews, permitting little access to clarifying dialogue
or tests of expertise, and providing few opportunities to scrutinize knowledge
quality. Important issues thus remain either undefined or ambiguous, allow-
ing decision makers to step in and impose assessments that reflect their own
values and trade-offs, articulate the overall balance between benefits and
costs, and control the presentation of results. Due to capacity constraints,
there is often insufficient time, money, and expertise for stakeholders to
evaluate the impacts of actions on their fundamental concerns or to think
about ways to reduce adverse consequences, which leaves only court pro-
ceedings as a possible (albeit very expensive) option for ‘‘buying time’’ to
reexamine an initial analysis. Thus, the contract with citizens is false: gov-
ernment and industry proclaim ‘‘Speak to us,’’ but are not able to pay atten-
tion to what stakeholders say because they are overwhelmed with what
hundreds or thousands of people and groups are telling them.
Examples abound: national consultations in the United States and Canada
about the pros and cons of the Keystone and Northern Gateway pipeline
proposals, municipal decision processes concerning road construction or
residential developments in natural areas, and state or provincial consulta-
tions about protection of threatened and endangered species. Each of these
situations typically involves the well-intentioned time, energy, and commit-
ment of thousands of citizens, hundreds of research scientists, and (generally)
a small army of lawyers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), all
hoping that their views and opinions will help to shape those of decision
makers. In far too many cases, however, the end result for public stake-
holders, proponents, and citizens is frustration, dissatisfaction, and a feeling
of not having been heard. From the standpoint of society at large, these
failures of inclusive participatory processes lead to the selection of inferior
actions and waste taxpayers’ money, create conflicts across different groups,
erode trust in elected decision makers, and generally reduce the opportunity
for diverse perspectives to be presented and discussed in an orderly and
constructive fashion (Stern and Fineberg 1996; US Environmental Protection
Agency 2009).
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Decision makers often justify citizens’ dashed expectations with refer-
ences to ‘‘the public interest’’ and the complexities of a multisided envi-
ronmental choice. Stakeholders—used here as a general term to refer to
individuals or groups, including Aboriginal participants or others with spe-
cial constitutional rights, who may be affected by a natural resource devel-
opment—often seek to explain their frustration and lack of influence as
evidence of corporate greed or government dictatorship. These explanations
stem from a diversity of factors and are, at times, appropriate. Yet the
disappointment and marginalization of many stakeholders who become
involved in environmental reviews and resource impact assessments is also
the predictable result of a flawed decision-making process, one that uses the
announced goal of inclusivity to substitute quantity for quality, breadth for
depth, labeling for listening, and an adversarial approach for dialogue and
informed understanding.
The Broken Promise of Environmental Risk
Consultations
Environmental risk consultations, as undertaken in North America, share
three main elements: ground rules for deciding who comes to the table and
under what terms, procedures for helping participants to discuss the prob-
lem and develop an informed understanding, and rules for aggregating
individual perspectives as part of an overall evaluation process (Gregory,
Fischhoff, andMcDaniels 2005). The specifics vary greatly across the many
different decision contexts and consultation approaches, but these three
elements typically form the backbone of the informal or formal contract
between participants and decision makers.
The benefits of inclusive environmental (and other public) risk consulta-
tions have been discussed in numerous documents, including reports by the
US National Research Council (Stern and Fineberg 1996), the Canadian
Standards Association (1997), and the US Presidential/Congressional Com-
mission on Risk (1997), as well as influential books (Renn, Webler, and
Wiedemann 1995; Dietz and Stern 2008) and papers (Chess and Purcell
1999; Rowe and Frewer 2000; Beierle 2002). These publications advance
inclusivity as one of several guiding principles (along with transparency,
respectfulness, etc.) and share similar advice that includes involving citi-
zens early and in ways that are meaningful, bringing in technical experts to
address factual issues, presenting information in ways that everyone under-
stands, and incorporating new learning as part of management strategies.
Yet they also share a notable lack of specific suggestions as to whether
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supplementary, more targeted input is needed and the terms under which
dialogue will take place (e.g., who should be involved and over what period
of time? Should stakeholders have a voice in selection of a consultation
approach? How should objectives be defined and operationalized?) as well
as a surprising reluctance to clearly define key terms (e.g., what does it
mean, at a practical level, to engage in a ‘‘meaningful’’ or ‘‘transparent’’
consultation or to ‘‘incorporate’’ local knowledge?). As a result, there is
ample room for consultants, government regulators, and facilitators to claim
they are following sensible consultation practices without necessarily
adhering to established standards or obtaining agreement from citizens
engaged in the supposedly successful communication (Gregory, Fischhoff,
and McDaniels 2005).
Informed deliberations are central to both risk consultations and demo-
cratic societies. To be successful, participants need to access and articulate
their own opinions based on an accurate understanding of reality. If these
conditions were always met, then the task of an analyst or facilitator leading
a risk assessment process would be straightforward: create a safe environ-
ment in which people can meet and deliberate and, when necessary, provide
help to access missing information. Unfortunately, these conditions are
rarely met; people seldom know exactly what they think concerning com-
plicated questions of public policy, and some portion of the available infor-
mation concerning outcomes is likely to be either erroneous or conflicting.
Analysts can help with these issues by assisting people to think through
tough problems and by bringing in appropriate experts on factual matters
about which participants may be ignorant or confused (Stern and Fineberg
1996). These topics have been discussed in numerous publications (Renn,
Webler, and Wiedemann 1995; Dietz and Stern 2008) and are central to the
arguments presented in the next section of this paper. Four issues are high-
lighted because they help set a context for the subsequent discussion of
problems associated with inclusivity.
First, although regulations often require extensive hearings on alterna-
tive actions or input from inclusive public consultation sessions, little nor-
mative guidance typically is available to help in the selection of a detailed
deliberative approach. As a result, it remains largely up to the decision
makers to decide which stakeholders will participate, the ground rules for
deliberation, whether people will be paid for their time and/or travel, and
the period over which discussions are expected to occur—two days? a
month? once each week for a full year? Far too often, the design of con-
sultative processes appears to depend more on improvisation than on defen-
sible criteria (Rossi 1997) and confuses means for ends: the assumption
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appears to be that if stakeholder involvement is viewed as the way to
provide decision makers with information about relevant issues, then
surely more participation will only lead to more data and better
informed policies (Kweit and Kweit 1987).
Whatever process is followed, an important concern is the relative
weight placed on input from different individuals or groups. The procedure
commonly used in large-scale inclusive consultations and quasi-judicial
review panels is for evidence to be collected, organized, and weighed by
the decision makers and their chosen staff; a good example is the 2013-2014
hearings into the proposed Northern Gateway bitumen pipeline in Canada,
which ended with citizens waiting for months while 209 recommendations
were assembled behind closed doors. This procedure encouraged the per-
ception, if not the actuality, of bias in that a less-than-transparent process
was used to perform the key tasks of grading information as higher or lower
in quality and as more or less relevant. In contrast, the best of environmental
consultations allow participants themselves to weight their expressed con-
cerns and to revise their stated values in light of others’ views (Gregory
et al. 2012; Pidgeon et al. 2014).
Second, many current consultation processes encourage, rather than dis-
courage, adversarial interactions among participants. This is particularly
true whenever individuals or groups are permitted only ten to fifteen min-
utes as part of an inclusive risk consultation process to speak before a panel
or one to two pages to summarize their concerns. In such cases, a rational
response is to focus on a single identifying interest: a local small business
owner will speak to regional economic impacts or a sports fisherman will
speak to fisheries impacts. However, this transforms a multidimensional
individual or group into a single-dimensional perspective—in addition to
other concerns, anglers care about jobs and business people also care about
the environment—and encourages an emphasis on differences among par-
ticipants rather than similarities. As a result, consultations become need-
lessly adversarial, leading to polarization rather than an understanding of
different perspectives (Sunstein 2000). And because people are speaking to
interests rather than impacts, what gets lost is the important distinction
between significant changes associated with the action(s) under consider-
ation and general concerns that, for the actions under review, will be
affected only slightly or not at all. As a result, time and resources can be
wasted on irrelevant concerns that, for the specific initiative under consid-
eration, do not merit attention.
Third, the meaning of an ‘‘informed dialogue’’ with stakeholders
remains controversial (Fischhoff 1991). A rationalist perspective, such as
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that outlined by practitioners of cost–benefit analysis (Freeman 2003) and
other monetary-based approaches, emphasizes the role of experts in identi-
fying key values at risk and translating these impacts into a single metric,
with separate accounts reserved for a variety of ‘‘intangible’’ considera-
tions. A behavioral perspective, such as that followed by practitioners of
structured decision-making (Gregory et al. 2012) and other methods that
build on findings from psychology and negotiations, emphasizes the need
for adopting multiple metrics and the importance of incorporating both fast
(intuitive and automatic) and slow (cognitive and deliberative) thinking,
along the lines outlined by Kahneman (2011) and other researchers. Dif-
ferences in these approaches extend not only to how values are identified
and the starting point for discussions among participants but also to their
scope, in terms of the diverse expressions of economic, environmental,
health, social, or cultural impacts of the actions under consideration that
merit inclusion as part of deliberations and analyses (Turner et al. 2008).
Where one is positioned with reference to an informed dialogue says a
great deal about the preferred type of environmental risk assessment pro-
cess. If the assumption is that everyone is fully informed and rational and
knows their own preferences, then resource development decisions could be
made using a simple voting process (assuming that high rates of voter
turnout would be ensured). Yet many inclusive environmental consultations
are characterized by information asymmetries, where some parties—often
intentionally—have access to better information than others (Akerlof
1970). If people are missing key facts or if some of the questions asked
of them are neither cognitively nor emotionally tractable, then a conven-
tional large-scale survey or voting procedure will produce meaningless
results (Fischhoff 2005; Gregory, Satterfield, and Hasell 2016).
A final issue concerns the choice of information sources and the treat-
ment of uncertainty. Any case that involves the prediction of impacts over
time will include substantial uncertainty about the anticipated future eco-
nomic, environmental, and social effects. As a result, one of the tasks facing
analysts and facilitators is to help participants recognize accurate, as
opposed to biased, sources of information. Although lively debates typi-
cally ensue with reference to the definition and selection of experts and the
relevance of different types of expertise (Burgman et al. 2011), rarely are
procedures outlined in advance for dealing with their inevitable disagree-
ments or for deciding how disputes will be examined and reported. Only in
rare cases are expert disagreements correctly viewed as either (a) a diag-
nostic that the questions being posed remain vague and ambiguous, in
which case diverse answers are to be expected (Poulton 1977) or (b) a
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source of important insights that should further be explored, for example,
using techniques such as expert judgment elicitations (Morgan 2014). And
even if the selected experts generally agree, it is important that they clearly
articulate both what they know (in terms understood by participants) and
what they don’t know, thereby characterizing their level of confidence in
the expressed factual evidence (Morgan and Henrion 1990).
In light of these concerns about the theory and conduct of environmental
consultations, many decision makers tasked with overseeing large-scale
environmental impact assessments take what might be seen as the ‘‘easy’’
route and opt for regulations and procedures that promise an inclusive
procedure—spending months or years on the topic, getting input from
hundreds or thousands of people who might be affected, inviting numerous
experts to be involved and amassing a daunting amount of information, and
finally releasing a report of hundreds or thousands of pages (with further
access keyed to numerous background documents). Despite its initial
appeal, an ‘‘inclusive’’ approach is rarely what the name suggests; instead,
it typically denies both access and relevant information to citizens and
permits decision makers to hold all the power, overwhelming the common
sense, resources, and energies of their constituents.
The Trouble with Inclusivity
Based on theory as well as practice, inclusivity—seemingly such a good and
common sense prescription for environmental risk consultations—is a con-
tributing explanation for the repeated occurrence of a variety of undesirable
results. Of course, consultations that emphasize principles other than inclu-
siveness also can go awry, for a variety of reasons that include a mismatch
between the personalities of decision makers or analysts and key stake-
holders. And inclusivity is typically a matter of degree, with many consul-
tations being multilayered processes that exhibit some combination of town
hall, Internet, small or large group, survey, and one-on-one opportunities for
participation (Pidgeon et al. 2014). With these reminders as caveats, this
section identifies and discusses six of the more serious problems that, to a
large degree, derive from a misplaced focus on inclusivity as a fundamental
goal of environmental risk consultations.
Failure to Identify the Fundamental Values at Risk
One of the principal tasks facing any assessment of environmental effects is
to identify the associated benefits, costs, and risks in relation to
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stakeholders’ values or concerns. The problem with a desire to be inclu-
sive—which then guides attempts to evaluate concerns as part of a risk
consultation process—is that the expressed impact set quickly grows to
be very large, composed of tens or hundreds of items. As one example, the
fracking study Pathways to Dialogue (Krupnick, Gordon, and Olmstead
2013) came up with 264 different risks to examine; this suggests the exis-
tence of problems but fails to provide guidance as to the structure or
sequence of next steps in the risk-assessment or risk-management process.
Inclusivity can even become a source of pride, so that those in charge of the
environmental review proudly request extra time on the basis of having
(literally) rooms or warehouses full of information. A successful environ-
mental consultation, in contrast, will collect and organize and structure
information so that it leads to a better understanding of the nature and
likelihood of those changes most significant to stakeholders and, in turn,
to the generation of better risk mitigation alternatives. Having so much
information that it becomes overwhelming is a sign of poor organization,
not thorough analysis: an excess of information represents a misalignment
of resources and purpose.
The cure is twofold. First, people should be helped to think through and
clearly articulate their fundamental concerns. In situations where the prob-
lem context involves novel risks or unfamiliar decision processes, then
peoples’ values are unlikely to be fully formed and their choices will reflect
the various cues that are provided along with their understanding of what is
being asked of them. This finding reflects the well-known concept of con-
structed preferences (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006), which suggests that the
context within which risk policy choices are (intentionally or unintention-
ally) framed can strongly influence peoples’ responses.
An important related task is to distinguish between values that are
means, such as better nutrition, and ends, such as better health (Keeney
1992). Clarifying the relationship among different values-based compo-
nents can help ensure that similar information resides together and can
readily be compared or integrated; this organizing function collects all
concerns relating to a general category of objectives (e.g., environmental,
economic, social) in one place and searches for redundancies or double
counting. Figure 1 presents an illustrative example of organizing social
concerns using a values hierarchy: the left-hand column presents concerns
as articulated by participants, with columns to the right showing how ana-
lysts helped to organize these into a smaller number of headings and then
into fundamental objectives. Guiding questions would include whether (as
inputs to family) ‘‘food’’ and ‘‘nutrition’’ have the same meaning, or (as
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inputs to education) whether ‘‘facilities’’ and ‘‘centers’’ are synonymous.
Without this clarifying discussion, it is impossible to determine the degree
to which concerns are shared among stakeholders or to track changes in
impact levels over time, both important goals of an impacts assessment.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the problem is not inclusivity per se; rather, it
is being content with the initial results of a listening- or concerns-
articulation process and not further organizing the information so that it
becomes more accessible to decision makers. As part of preparing for a
multistakeholder environmental impact assessment (EIA), for example,
Gregory and Keeney (1994, 1,039) describe first asking each participant
to ‘‘take 5–10 minutes to write down everything he or she believed to be
important for consideration’’ but then continuing on to ‘‘ . . . a probing
discussion of the reasons why an objective appeared on someone’s list.’’
This further structuring—distinguishing means and ends objectives, high-
lighting redundancies, eliminating irrelevant concerns—reorganized the
initial list of over 100 considerations into five major headings that included
three common objectives (economic, social, environmental) and two others
Figure 1. Illustrative (partial) values hierarchy.
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(political, international prestige) particularly important for the problem
context. Elected officials and participants reported that this ‘‘binning’’
was helpful because it replaced the confusion of an all-inclusive mix of
concerns with the clarity provided by focusing discussions on a much
smaller number of fundamental considerations.
A second point is that simple weighting and prioritization techniques can
permit stakeholders to help set management and action priorities among
their stated concerns rather than passing this essential task off to decision
makers. Professional staff has an important role to play in determining the
more significant impacts, in collecting and assessing relevant data, and in
allocating resources across a variety of competing evaluation tasks. Yet so
do the expert or public participants, using a range of techniques—largely
drawn from negotiation analysis and the decision sciences (Raiffa 2002;
Clemen and Reilly 2004)—that include value hierarchies, influence dia-
grams, and swing weights (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Otherwise,
it is inevitable that important considerations will be overlooked: the desire
to be inclusive places so much on the table that ad hoc or closed-door
processes cannot help but obscure important items and bury highly signif-
icant considerations alongside others that are either of minor significance or
completely irrelevant to the problem at hand. As noted by Rossi (1997,
216), as a result ‘‘ . . . the task of sifting bad from good information may
be burdensome or, far worse, bad information may drive out the good.’’
Knowing stakeholders’ priorities guarantees neither a smooth delibera-
tive process nor a consensus outcome. Because these are values-based
choices, often reflecting differences in risk tolerance, decision makers, and
stakeholders may well disagree about the focus of impact assessment and
mitigation efforts. However, in such cases, a comparison of stated priorities
should provide the basis for further dialogue and insight. Clarifying stake-
holder priorities also can function as a constraint on outside political pres-
sures (Gregory, McDaniels, and Fields 2001); few decision makers will
want to override the priority recommendations of an articulate and well-
informed advisory committee of stakeholders.
Failure to Disentangle Facts from Values
The general lack of structure that accompanies a desire to be inclusive can
result in the presentation of supposedly objective factual information that,
in actuality, is suspect due to the intentions of its source. As one example,
many resource development projects are introduced with great fanfare and
promise because of the large number of future jobs said to be provided; a
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case in point is incentives being provided to the liquefied natural gas (LNG)
industry in British Columbia, Canada, where in July 2013 the provincial
premier promised ‘‘100,000 new jobs in the province over 30 years from all
the [LNG] projects’’ if swift approvals were forthcoming. Based on these
proclamations, many citizens assumed that a boost in provincial employ-
ment would be one of the beneficial effects of accelerated natural resource
development. Yet to cite ‘‘jobs’’ (whether 100,000 or, as now appears more
likely, less than 1,000) as an important value is meaningless, or (worse)
intentionally misleading, unless information also is provided about assump-
tions underlying the calculation (e.g., future energy prices and generation
alternatives) along with the type and number of jobs (seasonal or full-
time?), a description of who the new workers will be (local residents or
in-migrants?), the expected longevity of the positions (six months or twenty
years?), and whether other jobs might be lost in order to provide for these
new opportunities (i.e., distinguishing ‘‘net’’ from ‘‘gross’’ impacts).
The superficiality of inclusive processes encourages a reliance on the
emotional content of a benefits category such as ‘‘jobs’’—a system 1
automatic or emotional response—rather than also bringing in system
2’s more deliberative and thoughtful response (Kahneman 2011).
Because it provides neither time nor resources to encourage informed
deliberation, an inclusive process also makes it more difficult for either
stakeholders or decision makers to make sense of sharp differences in
opinion with regard to the interpretation of facts. In the case of large
fossil-fuel developments such as LNG plants, for example, what one
person sees as the source of an ‘‘economic benefit’’ another may view
as ‘‘undesirable growth.’’ These differences in perspective are typically
not amenable to scientific input and, in many cases, should not be:
science can help get the facts right but ultimately whether a suite of
impacts is considered, on balance, either ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ is a question
of values—a proper topic for dialogue, but one about which science is
moot (von Winterfeldt 2013).
Failure to Agree on Expertise
Technical experts are part of any environmental review or impact assess-
ment process, whether as authors of background studies and reports, as
consultants, or (in the case of review panels and litigation) as expert wit-
nesses. In most cases, experts are viewed as having substantive and specia-
lized knowledge of the facts relevant to the decision context (Burgman
2016). This is generally sensible, although several characteristics of
Gregory 155
inclusive processes mean that invited experts often contribute only limited
insights or clarification.
A first concern is that the different participants in an inclusive process
are likely to advocate on behalf of their own trusted experts. As a result, a
consultation process seeking to be inclusive can involve testimonies from
hundreds of so-called experts, each selected by a different stakeholder and
each with their own credentials, training, and perspective. In contrast to
more structured decision processes, which encourage experts to signal and
examine their areas of agreement and disagreement, most inclusive pro-
cesses provide little opportunity to resolve disputes because there is no
official forum for deliberation among the different experts. For example,
few inclusive processes take advantage of approaches such as expert judg-
ment elicitations (Morgan 2014), which provide opportunities for experts
with different perspectives on a problem to compare the assumptions and
reasoning behind their assessments and then to make revisions based on
new information and learning.
A second concern is that the expertise of many so-called experts may be
highly questionable, at least in the decision context in which it is being
provided (Burgman et al. 2011). The purpose of an individual’s testimony is
to provide an informed opinion, often involving predictions or forecasts;
this requires that the expert be knowledgeable about the specific issue under
consideration and assess accurately their confidence in the information they
provide. Yet not every expert is either this thoughtful or this humble, and
not every expert will be comfortable explaining their thinking and examin-
ing their assumptions in front of others. Providing useful judgments requires
a distinct set of skills: someone who knows how to bake a cake may not be
the right person to help predict the number of cakes that will be baked over
the next fifteen years in a specified metropolitan area. Establishing criteria
for experts’ involvement can be done but the more inclusive the consulta-
tion process, the lower the bar that is likely to be set and the greater the
opportunity for conflicting or irrelevant advice (as many Internet users—a
famously inclusive consultation site—will testify).
Lack of Criteria for Assessing Knowledge Quality
A process that is inclusive will assemble large amounts of data perceived as
factual, based on the literature or testimonies from concerned parties. With
many groups and individuals participating (thousands, in some cases), too
little attention typically is given to the source of the information, its quality,
or the basis for its appeal. For example, information from a scientist may be
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closely listened to by some participants and ignored by others; similarly,
information from local knowledge holders or resource users (e.g., farmers
or hunters) may be considered reliable by some and ignored by others.
Consider the testimony of two experts with respect to the long-term ecolo-
gical effects of a proposed mining development: one is a widely published
academic from a university in another country and the other is an elder from
a nearby native community. Without criteria to assess knowledge relevance
or quality, the reception given to the testimony of either individual will
largely reflect the experience, personality, and biases of the listener.
Yet for most public risk problems, there are legitimately many different
ways of knowing and a range of so-called experts. Only if criteria are in
place can the desire for a level playing field mean that all knowledge
sources are subjected to the same level of scrutiny by asking questions
such as: what are the individual’s qualifications for this task? Are there
reasons (e.g., employment history) to anticipate motivational or other
biases? Over what time period and with what degree of accuracy have
the observations been made? (Failing, Gregory, and Harstone 2007). The
implementation of such knowledge quality criteria violates the goal of
inclusivity but can help to exclude biased experts and reduce inaccurate
information, resulting in better data for the assessment and a more stream-
lined, efficient consultation process.
Failure to Address Contentious Issues
If a primary goal of an assessment and consultation process is to be inclu-
sive, then it is likely that the process will fail to address many of the more
fundamental concerns raised by stakeholders. The reason is simple: in order
for the process to involve and satisfy a broad spectrum of people, who likely
differ in their definitions of a problem’s scope and in their favored infor-
mation sources, it will be necessary to avoid many of the more contentious,
emotional, or controversial aspects of the decision: oil pipeline consulta-
tions are told to ignore climate change, and nuclear plant sitings are
instructed to ignore waste storage issues. In the usual case, troublesome
topics will be set aside and considered at a later date, either as part of a
subsequent process or a different forum. Even if an attempt is made to
address some of the more contentious issues, their purported ‘‘resolution’’
typically will be at a high enough level that different stakeholders are able
to see what they want to see in the suggested solution. This is the typical
usage, for example, of terms such as ‘‘sustainable actions’’ or strategies ‘‘in
the public interest’’—it’s easy for disparate stakeholders to agree that
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outcomes should be sustainable and serve the public, but it’s likely to be
difficult for these same stakeholders to agree on exactly what these vague
descriptors really mean.
If a decision maker receives only the information that all members of an
advisory committee support a high-level criteria—for example, that more
sustainability or transparency is preferred to less—then he or she still has
the unenviable task of crafting an action that supposedly embodies this
concern. In contrast, if the deliberative process is able to pass on detailed
information about how each alternative is rated in terms of the more con-
tentious concerns—a level of detail that typically is impossible as part of a
more inclusive process—then the decision maker has gained access to
knowledge that allows for proposing a specific action with foreknowledge
of how it will be received by different parties or how to modify it to enhance
(if positive) or reduce (if negative) the expected reactions of stakeholders.
The point is not that agreement on principles is unimportant, since it is often
a necessary starting point for risk assessments and negotiations. Rather, a
statement of principles is only a start and it is ultimately up to the stake-
holders, and not the decision makers alone, to either agree to or reject a
specific action that is supposed to be in line with more general principles.
Avoidance of contentious issues often occurs when there are emotional
reactions to a proposed action or when moral and ethical concerns arise in
the context of social, cultural, or health considerations associated with a
predicted change (Roeser, Sabine, and Pesch 2016). Nearly every environ-
mental assessment refers to these more ‘‘intangible’’ values as being impor-
tant, but they are often excluded from summary analyses because of
presumed measurement difficulties or, in other cases, confined to a separate
document (e.g., focusing on community health or traditional resource uses),
which often results in their omission from the overall project analysis
(Turner et al. 2008). A focus on inclusivity contributes to their omission
because methods for eliciting and incorporating changes to social and cul-
tural values depend on in-depth and interactive discussions (e.g., between
analysts and community members) that require both time and trust (Gregory
et al. 2012; Satterfield et al. 2013).
A focus on inclusivity and breadth also means there will be fewer oppor-
tunities to develop trusting relationships between leaders of the consultative
process and potentially affected stakeholders or community members,
which in turn can increase participants’ reluctance to articulate impact
concerns thought to be of questionable legitimacy. In the context of deci-
sions at a managed river, for example, community members were at first
reluctant to raise concerns stemming from flow-related changes in the
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‘‘smell and sound’’ of the river. Only after multiple discussions was this
important concern brought into the formal comparison of management
alternatives (Failing, Gregory, and Harstone 2007). Other types of fre-
quently hidden concerns involve anticipated changes in lifestyles (e.g.,
due to new employment opportunities), changes to political relationships
within a community (e.g., actions favoring one family group over
another), or threats to the continuation of traditional harvesting practices
(because locations often are kept confidential). In the absence of a trusting
relationship, these contentious issues are less likely to be shared with
analysts or other group members and, as a result, less likely to help shape
analyses and decisions.
Lack of Capacity for Full Participation
At some point, each of the potentially affected participants (e.g., commu-
nity residents, industry, Tribes or Indian bands, federal government agen-
cies) is tasked with reviewing all the information and recommendations
gathered as part of the risk assessment process and making sense of
impacts in terms of its own values and priorities. If the materials are
intended to be ‘‘inclusive,’’ resulting in a large volume of studies and
typically without (as noted in previous sections) clear distinctions being
made among the estimated impacts, then the task of reviewing every-
thing—generally within a relatively short time period—from the stand-
point of a community’s own practices and values can be daunting. As a
result, significant impacts may be overlooked or misunderstood due to
capacity considerations related to a lack of qualified individuals with
sufficient time to undertake the necessary review of large quantities of
verbal, visual, qualitative, and quantitative information.
Capacity constraints apply especially in the case of larger or megapro-
jects—including oil pipelines, large wind farms or transmission lines, and
hydroelectric dams—which require careful reviews of reports frommultiple
agencies and consultants. For smaller groups and communities, or for
NGOs and other parties who may lack some of the required skills, this often
means a nonstop uphill run at completion of a seemingly never-ending
sequence of incoming environmental assessments. It takes time and a com-
bination of factual and values-based knowledge to first review proposed
actions in depth and then to suggest ways that positive impacts can be
expanded and negative effects curtailed or avoided through mitigation.
To the extent that marginalized communities are disproportionately
impacted and appropriate resources within these communities already are
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claimed by other pressing tasks, then environmental justice considerations
suggest that proposed projects are unlikely to be scrutinized sufficiently to
identify all possible damages or to incorporate all possible mitigation
opportunities (English 2004).
It is true that large review processes can create new capacity with the
help of added funding from either industry or government. For example, the
establishment of environmental review processes in both North America
and Europe clearly has resulted in additional employment opportunities for
some community residents as well as outside individuals trained in resource
planning, ecology and biology, or environmental economics. Yet the
increased volume of resource-based applications also has shifted the
emphasis within many government agencies and local communities away
from self-generation to a more reactive mode, whereby decisions about
future stewardship and development options are framed in reference to
opportunities generated by outsiders (referred to by Turner et al. 2013,
563, as ‘‘blundering intruders’’).
Discussion and Recommendations
The understanding of what it means to conduct a successful environmental
risk consultation has shifted greatly over recent decades, with increased
emphasis now placed by regulators and their contractors on the importance
of direct citizen participation and stakeholders’ access to documentation
submitted by the various participants. This shift has been assisted by the
increased use of computer-generated information, which permits tens of
thousands of people access to thousands of reports stored on the websites
of individuals, government agencies, NGOs, and industry. Yet neither
higher numbers of participants nor greater volumes of information will
ensure better or more informed decision-making processes. Instead, a
defensible risk consultation process needs to meet other important yet typi-
cally neglected criteria: providing the necessary structure and resources to
help citizens identify and articulate their fundamental values at risk, to
become better informed about relevant facts by asking questions of quali-
fied experts, and through both introspection and deliberation to decide
which impacts and trade-offs are most important.
This paper argues that making inclusivity a primary focus of public
participation efforts undertaken by environmental management agencies
comes at a high price: once advanced as a goal of the process then other
objectives, explicitly or implicitly, will become less important. And
because resources are constrained, there will always exist a tension between
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depth and breadth, described nearly two decades ago as ‘‘ . . . a trade-off
between participation and deliberation: increased participation comes only
at the cost of diminished deliberation’’ (Rossi 1997, 179).
Thankfully, there are multiple options for conducting environmental risk
consultations, ones that could over time shift the focus of regulatory
requirements and practices to more in-depth deliberative processes based
on principles such as being responsive to stakeholders’ key concerns, ensur-
ing that information is both cognitively and emotionally tractable, provid-
ing a basis for dialogue and learning among participants, and establishing
effective ways to communicate participants’ concerns to decision makers
(Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Dietz 2013). By shifting the emphasis away from
inclusivity, scarce time and resources could be freed to promote delibera-
tions that seek to clarify key stakeholder priorities and identify relevant
factual information, with the intent of replacing an adversarial process with
one that promotes understanding, dialogue, and (possibly) agreement (Pid-
geon et al. 2014). A short list of approaches for successfully conducting
environmental risk consultations includes the following efforts, all well
described (along with case study specifics) in existing literature and reports:
 Small groups (ten to twenty-five people), consisting of representa-
tives of the different stakeholder perspectives, who meet together six
to ten times and use carefully articulated objectives, measures, and
value trade-offs to generate and compare management alternatives in
terms of their predicted consequences. One example is the multi-
facility water use plan process in British Columbia, Canada (Failing,
Horn, and Higgins 2004; Gregory et al. 2012), organized through a
government—industry initiative.
 Multiple groups (e.g., citizen, technical, and special interests), with
overall coordination through a centralized management committee
that administers and oversees funds based on a consistent program-
wide evaluation of actions. The Lake Champlain Basin Program,
which coordinates watershed management activities for Lake Cham-
plain in Vermont, New York, and the Province of Quebec, provides a
good example (Lake Champlain Steering Committee 2010).
 Interviews and small-group discussions, subsequently informed by
results from large-scale surveys. The climate change and national
energy system deliberations undertaken in the UK (Corner et al.
2013; Pidgeon et al. 2014) used this multimethod approach to pro-
vide guidance to the national government regarding public views
toward a preferred future mix of energy generation alternatives.
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Our concern is that the emphasis on inclusivity as part of environmental
risk consultation guidelines or regulatory requirementswill remain an excuse
for not really hearing what stakeholders have to say and will continue to
permit decision makers to pick and choose those portions of an overall
assessment that support their point of view. By including everyone, and by
emphasizing breadth of coverage rather than depth of understanding, trans-
parency and control are taken away from citizens and given over to whom-
ever is in charge of the consultation process. Decision makers thus break the
promise they havemade: put out the effort to tell us what you have to say and
we will put in the effort to listen. But they don’t, and can’t, because by
inviting everyone decision makers are able to listen carefully to no one.
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